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Women’s empowerment—their ability to participate on the
basis of equality in all spheres of decision making, both public
and private—has both intrinsic and instrumental value: intrin-
sic in that greater equity in decision making is desirable in its
own right (United Nations, 1995); instrumental in that more
decision-making power for women has been linked to a range
of desirable outcomes, particularly those related to child wel-
fare (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing & Maluccio,
2003; Thomas, 1990, 1997). Empowerment can be enhanced
not only through legal changes and changes to social norms,
but also through economic factors. The potential for economic
factors—and in particular, women’s control of resources—to
aﬀect women’s control over decision making has both theoret-
ical and empirical support in the literature (Duﬂo, 2011; Lund-
berg & Pollak, 1996; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 1999). There is
evidence that resource control, in turn, can be enhanced by
giving women more rights to productive assets (see, e.g., Agar-
wal, 1994) or through transfers of resources to women which
are independent of marriage (see, e.g., Thomas, 1997).
A feature of many Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) pro-
grams, widespread in Latin America and increasingly popular
throughout the world, is that cash transfers are made to wo-
men. This feature was itself informed by earlier research sug-
gesting that increased resource control by women was linked
to both increased decision-making power among women and
improved outcomes for children (see Behrman, 2010, for a re-
view). The Bolsa Famı´lia program in Brazil is an example of
such a CCT, wherein designating women as transfer recipients
“. . . is intended to compensate mothers for their traditional
domestic and care work role, to ensure that programme co-
responsibilities are met and in recognition of the fact that they
are most likely to ensure that increased household income ben-
eﬁts children. Transferring cash to women is also seen as a way
to promote their control over household resources and in-
crease their bargaining power at home” (Holmes, Jones, Var-
gas, & Veras, 2010).
Conditional cash transfers could aﬀect women’s decision-
making power through several diﬀerent channels. In Nash
cooperative bargainingmodels of household behavior, more re-
sources controlled by a woman implies a higher “threat point”
for exiting a partnership and therefore greater bargaining
power within the partnership, giving the womanmore of a voice487in decisions. If cash transferred to women is kept in women’s
own control, women’s overall resource control within the
household may increase. If participation in cash transfer pro-
grams also increases women’s labor supply (e.g., due to expand-
ing their social networks), women may earn more labor income
over which they have control, and therefore may control on net
a greater amount of household resources. There is also potential
that, as total household resources increase through transfers
(regardless of whom the transfers are given to), there is in-
creased specialization within the household of control over re-
sources, such that women take greater responsibility for
decisions in speciﬁc spheres. However, transferring cash to wo-
men does not necessarily imply an increase in women’s control
over household resources. Handa, Peterman, Davis, and Stam-
pini (2009), for example, note that providing transfers to wo-
men may not translate to their being given control over these
resources by their partners. Moreover, if women’s primary
pre-program sources of cash are transfers from their spouses,
and the program transfers simply crowd out these intrahouse-
hold transfers, the eﬀect on the amount of resources under wo-
men’s control may be limited. In addition, if cash transfers are
conditional on fulﬁllment of conditionalities that require time,
and if women must divert substantial time from earning labor
income, the reduction in labor income may reduce the amount
of resources in their control.
Given the growing popularity of such programs and wide-
spread interest in increasing women’s empowerment, it is of
inherent value to assess whether resource transfers to women
through these programs are in fact eﬀective in improving wo-
men’s positions within the household. While several qualita-
tive studies suggest that CCTs with female beneﬁciaries
increase women’s decision-making power on certain issues
within the household (see, e.g., Adato & Roopnaraine,
2010), quantitative study of this eﬀect in the context of CCTs
488 WORLD DEVELOPMENTis both limited and inconclusive. Quantitative evidence on the
impacts of the Progresa CCT program in rural Mexico is
mixed: Adato, de la Briere, Mindek, and Quisumbing (2000)
show quantitative evidence suggesting that direct eﬀects on
women’s decision making are not supported, Attanasio and
Lechene (2002) ﬁnd evidence of slight shifts from decisions
made solely by men to decisions made jointly by men and wo-
men across several spheres of household decision making, and
Handa et al. (2009) ﬁnd impacts only on women’s ability to
spend their own cash but not in other household decision mak-
ing spheres. Using Progresa data or the rural dataset on
Oportunidades (the successor program to Progresa), several
papers also show responses in household expenditures or other
behavior to exogenous changes in household members’ income
due to program receipt, indirectly attributing these changes to
intrahousehold decision making dynamics (Angelucci, 2008;
Attanasio & Lechene, 2010; Bobonis, 2009; Djebbari, 2005;
Rubalcava, Teruel, & Thomas, 2008). Four extensive reviews
of CCT and other cash transfer programs (Department for
International Development, 2011; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009;
Holmes & Jones, 2010; Molyneux & Tabbush, 2008) do not in-
clude any quantitative studies of the impact of CCTs on intra-
household decision making, while a recent systematic review
by Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen (2012) on diﬀerential
impacts of economic resource transfer to men and women
ﬁnds no consensus on whether CCTs increase women’s deci-
sion-making power. As such, existing research suggests that
there may be impacts of CCTs on women’s decision making,
but the body of evidence is small, narrow in coverage (drawn
largely from CCTs in rural Mexico), and gives little insight
into how impacts might diﬀer in diﬀerent contexts.
In this paper, we contribute to ﬁlling this knowledge gap by
presenting quantitative evidence that the Bolsa Famı´lia pro-
gram in Brazil had signiﬁcant impacts in several areas of wo-
men’s decision making, but that there is considerable
heterogeneity in impacts across diﬀerent types of households. 1
The context of Brazil is inherently interesting for this area of
study. Bolsa Famı´lia has nationwide coverage across both ur-
ban and rural areas, in one of the most populous countries in
the world, making it the largest conditional cash transfer pro-
gram in terms of number of beneﬁciaries. Brazil has also pri-
oritized women’s empowerment in its national policy. As
such, Bolsa Famı´lia provides a unique opportunity to assess
the impacts of CCTs on women’s decision making in a large,
diverse setting covering both rural and urban areas and where
women’s empowerment is a key goal. However, many facets of
the program and the nature of available data pose challenges
for impact evaluation. In this paper, we lay out these various
challenges, then propose an evaluation strategy that helps
overcome them. Our preferred approach makes use of propen-
sity score weighting (Hirano, Imbens, & Ridder, 2003), an im-
pact estimation methodology that allows us to exploit the
variation in our data taking into account that the program
was not randomly assigned, while also cleanly accounting
for the sampling and attrition weights that are crucial in our
setting.
We ﬁnd that women’s decision-making power increases
along several dimensions, but with heterogeneity in impacts.
A key ﬁnding is that participation in Bolsa Famı´lia increases
the share of women who report exclusive control over contra-
ception decisions by 10 percentage points in our aggregated
estimation sample. While we cannot infer from the survey re-
sponse whether being the decision maker regarding contracep-
tion necessarily means deciding to use contraception (as
opposed to deciding not to use contraception), this result is
particularly interesting in light of concerns that CCT pro-grams providing transfers that increase on a per-child basis
may induce increased fertility. Disaggregating between urban
and rural areas, we ﬁnd that in urban areas, not only are the
impacts on decision making regarding contraception even lar-
ger and more strongly signiﬁcant, there are also signiﬁcant in-
creases in women’s control over decisions in several other
areas including children’s school attendance, children’s health
expenses, and purchases of durable goods. In fact, this disag-
gregation reveals that all statistically signiﬁcant positive im-
pacts in our sample are concentrated in urban areas. In rural
areas, we ﬁnd that Bolsa Famı´lia causes no signiﬁcant in-
creases and possibly even reductions in women’s decision mak-
ing power. While the sample size in rural areas is relatively
smaller than in urban areas, the estimated diﬀerences between
impacts across subsamples are statistically signiﬁcant, suggest-
ing that cash transfers to women may translate very diﬀerently
to women’s resource control in rural versus urban areas. These
diﬀerences in Bolsa Famı´lia’s eﬀect across urban and rural
areas are consistent with related work on Bolsa Famı´lia’s ef-
fects on labor supply as well as with previous qualitative ﬁnd-
ings. As a whole, the results oﬀer a contribution to the
literature, both in providing rare direct quantitative evidence
of a CCT’s impact on speciﬁc areas of women’s decision mak-
ing and in showing heterogeneity of these impacts based on
household characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a descrip-
tion of the Bolsa Famı´lia program, highlighting features that
motivate our evaluation strategy. Section 3 describes the data
collection, provides descriptive statistics on the women’s deci-
sion making variables on which we focus, and describes our
use of the data to construct treatment and comparison groups.
Section 4 describes our evaluation strategy, including the use
of propensity score weighting to balance observables across
the treatment and comparison groups. Section 5 presents our
results with discussion. Section 6 concludes.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE BOLSA FAMI´LIA PROGRAM
Bolsa Famı´lia is the largest conditional cash transfer pro-
gram in the world. It began in 2003 and by 2011 provided
assistance to over 12 million Brazilian families. Payments con-
sist of (1) an unconditional transfer to “extremely poor”
households below a certain per capita income threshold; and
(2) an additional conditional variable payment per child aged
0–15 years, for up to three children, to “poor” households be-
low a higher per capita income threshold. The transfer is con-
ditional on pregnant women receiving timely prenatal care
visits, children aged 0–5 receiving timely vaccinations and
growth monitoring visits, and all children aged 6–15 attending
school. 2
To be eligible for Bolsa Famı´lia payments, households must
be listed in a registry called the Cadastro U´nico. This registry
contains information on household demographic characteris-
tics, household income, and prior participation in transfer pro-
grams. All households are free to register in the Cadastro.
However, municipality-level oﬃcials are responsible for orga-
nizing the registration process, such that there is substantial
heterogeneity across municipalities in targeting for Cadastro
registration, as well as in registration methods (Lindert, Lin-
der, Hobbs, & de la Brie`re, 2007). 3
Moreover, conditional on registration in the Cadastro, the
criteria for selection into Bolsa Famı´lia also diﬀer by munici-
pality. Beneﬁciaries are selected at the national level, through
the following procedure. Each municipality is assigned a quota
for maximum number of Bolsa Famı´lia recipient households
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in a particular municipality with income per capita below the
threshold is lower than the municipality’s quota, then all such
households are selected for Bolsa Famı´lia. 5 If the number of
households in a particular municipality with income per capita
below the threshold exceeds the municipality’s quota, priority
is assigned for selecting households into Bolsa Famı´lia roughly
according to the following criteria 6: (1) lower household in-
come per capita, and (2) the number of children aged 0–17
in the household. Consequently, while eligibility criteria are
similar across municipalities, two households below the in-
come per capita threshold with very similar characteristics
may have diﬀerent recipient status due to being in municipal-
ities with diﬀerent quotas and due to diﬀerences in prioritiza-
tion of eligibility criteria across municipalities.
An implication of these program features is that there is
likely to be some dimension of self-selection into the program,
in the sense that Cadastro registration is voluntary. This fea-
ture will motivate our conditioning of impact estimates on
Cadastro registration, described in Section 3(c). Another
implication is that there are likely to be very similar house-
holds in similar but distinct municipalities that, due to diﬀer-
ences in municipality-level quotas and prioritization, have
diﬀerent Bolsa Famı´lia recipient status. This variation will be
key to our identiﬁcation strategy, described in Section 4. We
interpret the municipality-level variation in procedures as sug-
gesting that, once a large set of household characteristics and
municipality characteristics are accounted for, the probability
that a particular household is a recipient of Bolsa Famı´lia is
uncorrelated with the outcomes we consider.3. DATA
(a) Data collection
In 2005, 15,426 households were interviewed under the
supervision of the Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento
Regional (Cedeplar). Commissioned by the Federal Ministry
of Social Development (MDS) as part of a baseline study on
Bolsa Famı´lia referred to as AIBF-1 (“Avaliaca˜o de Impacto
do Programa Bolsa Famı´lia”), this multipurpose survey in-
cluded household-level questions on demographics, living con-
ditions, assets, income, consumption, anthropometry, health
and education, participation in cash transfer and subsidy pro-
grams, and women’s decision making.
The sampling design included some households that in 2005
were already participating in Bolsa Famı´lia (Stratum 1), some
households that in 2005 were registered in Cadastro U´nico but
not participating in Bolsa Famı´lia (Stratum 2), and some
households that in 2005 were not in Cadastro U´nico and there-
fore were not participating in Bolsa Famı´lia (Stratum 3). The
sampling strategy for AIBF-1 was intended to be such that
approximately 30% of households fell in Stratum 1, 60% fell
in Stratum 2, and 10% fell in Stratum 3. However, based on
households’ responses to AIBF-1, in fact about 40% fell within
the deﬁnition of Stratum 1, 35% fell within the deﬁnition of
Stratum 2, and 25% fell within the deﬁnition of Stratum 3.
Households in the North, North-East, and Center-West re-
gions were oversampled, while those in the South-East and
South were undersampled. Sample weights were constructed
to make the data nationally representative.
In 2009, a follow-up survey (AIBF-2) of the same house-
holds was ﬁelded. It was able to trace and re-interview
11,433 of the original households, implying an annual attrition
rate of approximately 6.5%. The main sources of attrition were
ﬁeld teams being unable to physically locate respondents’recorded addresses and households no longer residing at their
recorded addresses (de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, Moreira,
& Roy, 2010). Based on information in the surveys, we con-
structed attrition weights to be used in conjunction with the
original sample weights, to take into account the nonrandom
attrition. 7 In both 2005 and 2009, households were asked
about their registration in Cadastro U´nico as well as whether
they received transfers. Thus, we are able to observe how
households transition over the two rounds across various com-
binations of being registered in Cadastro U´nico and receiving
Bolsa Famı´lia transfers.(b) Women’s decision making variables
Since decision making refers to a process that is fundamen-
tally unobservable to a researcher, there are inherent chal-
lenges in constructing concrete indicators. A substantial
literature suggests that women’s ownership of assets is a key
determinant of women’s status in the household (e.g., Faf-
champs & Quisumbing, 2002; Quisumbing & Maluccio,
2003). However, gender-disaggregated asset information is
not available in our data, nor is it necessarily the most infor-
mative measure to use in this setting. First, if receiving Bolsa
Famı´lia transfers aﬀects only certain spheres of women’s deci-
sion making and not others, a single measure like assets does
not allow us to distinguish the inﬂuenced decision making
spheres. Second, current asset ownership is not a direct mea-
sure of decision-making power itself, rather a determinant of
it. Relative ownership of assets at marriage, which is some-
times used as a proxy for women’s decision-making power,
could not have been aﬀected by Bolsa Famı´lia transfers for
most households in our sample.
A related literature takes an inferential approach to measur-
ing intrahousehold resource allocation, which is sometimes ta-
ken as a measure of relative bargaining power of husbands
and wives (Chiappori, 1988; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; Tho-
mas, 1990). This literature tests whether income under a wo-
man’s control is associated with a diﬀerent pattern of
expenditures or other outcomes than income under a man’s
control. These papers focus primarily on testing whether
household decision making is consistent with a unitary house-
hold model and on verifying that patterns of expenditures dif-
fer by the gender of the decision maker. Although this
conﬁrms that spouses do not have equal bargaining power,
it does not identify how their bargaining power diﬀers, or
across what spheres of decision making.
We therefore focus on a set of questions in our dataset that
directly address the process of decision making, asking sepa-
rately about several distinct spheres. 8 In both the AIBF-1
and AIBF-2, women were asked a series of questions about
who in the household generally makes decisions about a range
of issues: “purchases of food”; “clothing for yourself”; “cloth-
ing for your spouse or partner”; “clothing for children”; “when
your child must stop attending school”; “health-related expen-
ditures for children”; “the purchase of consumer durables for
the home”; “if you work or not”; “if your spouse works”;
and “your decision to use contraception.” Response options
in 2005 included “myself”; “my spouse or partner”; “decisions
are made jointly; “decisions are made by others”; “decisions
are made by children” (for some questions); and “don’t know.”
In 2009, response options included all of the same except “deci-
sions are made jointly,” but the woman was allowed to select
multiple responses, such that responding both “myself” and
“my spouse or partner” indicated a joint decision.
The questions on decision making were intended to be asked
to the female spouse of the head or the female head, if
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Figure 1. Average proportion reporting female decision making power
regarding speciﬁc decisions, Bolsa Famı´lia transfer recipients and nonrecip-
ients, 2009. Proportions account for sample weights and attrition weights.
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spouse), another female was to be asked. 9 Whenever possible,
the woman was asked these questions alone, with no one but
the enumerator present. When this was not possible, and in
particular when it was not possible to ask the questions with-
out the woman’s spouse present, the enumerator recorded
“spouse present.”
Akey advantage to these questions is that they allow us to dis-
tinguish whether the impacts of CCTs are found only in certain
areas of decision making, as some qualitative work suggests.
However, several considerations remain in interpreting the re-
sponses. First, the responses are self-reported answers to subjec-
tive questions, making them subject to misreporting. However,
even if there is a mean bias in the self-reports, it is reasonable to
interpret anymean diﬀerences in self-reports asmeaningful. For
example, while we ﬁnd evidence in the data that presence of a
spouse during the interview may bias responses in favor of
“joint decisions,” presence of a spouse is balanced across our
treatment and comparison groups, such that this factor should
not account for diﬀerences across the groups (See Appendix Ta-
ble 8). Also, if changes in responses to these questions do not re-
ﬂect true changes in women’s decision-making power, they at
least reﬂect changes in the women’s perceptions of their deci-
sion-making power, which may still be welfare enhancing. Sec-
ond, there is ambiguity in determining which response reﬂects
that a woman has more of a voice in decision making. It is not
obvious whether a joint decision between a man and woman
necessarily reﬂects that the woman has less of a voice than she
would as a sole decision maker. Based on accumulated evidence
suggesting that women often report that decisions are “joint”
even when their male partners in fact have the ﬁnal say (Becker
& Costenbader, 2001; Petro-Nustas, 1999; Wolﬀ, Blanc, & Sse-
kamatte-Ssebuliba, 2000), 10 for ourmain analysis, we choose to
interpret decisions for which a woman reports being the sole
decision maker as the decisions in which she most unambigu-
ously has a voice. 11 Third, responses are categorical, complicat-
ing the construction of an indicator. Because we are primarily
focused onwhether the program shifts the balance of bargaining
power betweenmale and female partners, for ourmain analysis,
we focus on the distinction between decisionsmade solely by the
female versus decisions made jointly or made solely by the
male. 12 We also re-run the analysis focusing on the distinction
between decisionsmade solely by the female ormade jointly ver-
sus decisions made solely by the male, to characterize decisions
in which the woman reports having at least some voice. We ﬁnd
qualitatively very similar results between the two measures.
We focus on eight areas of decision making: food purchases,
clothes for self, clothes for children, children’s school atten-
dance, children’s health expenses, durable goods, own labor
supply, and contraception. Because our interest is in the
dynamics of decision making within a partnership that heads
the household, we restrict attention to households in which
the respondent is either the female spouse of the head or a fe-
male head whose spouse also resides in the household. We do
not consider households in which the respondent is a female
head with no spouse, or is related to the head in some other
way than as the spouse. 13
Figure 1 illustrates, for each of the decision spheres de-
scribed above, the proportion of households in the AIBF-2
who report women are the sole decision maker, by Bolsa Famı´-
lia recipient status. There are two key observations to note
from Figure 1. First, we observe that in 2009, within each spe-
ciﬁc type of decision, there are substantial diﬀerences between
Bolsa Famı´lia recipients and nonrecipients. We cannot inter-
pret these diﬀerences as causal impacts of the program, be-
cause the overall group of nonrecipients is likely to containhouseholds that would not be comparable to the group of
recipients even in the absence of the program and so do not
belong in the comparison group. However, the descriptive dif-
ferences suggest the potential to ﬁnd program impact. Second,
looking across decisions, there are noticeable diﬀerences in the
proportion of households with women as sole decision makers
across diﬀerent types of decisions. These diﬀerences suggest
that we may expect to see more potential for impact in some
decisions than others.
(c) Considerations for impact evaluation
To learn from these data how receipt of Bolsa Famı´lia af-
fected women’s decision-making power in various spheres, we
wish to estimate Average-Treatment-on-the-Treated (ATT)
impacts for the households receiving Bolsa Famı´lia. The key
challenge inherent to estimating ATT impacts is that we wish
to measure the diﬀerence between the actual outcomes of a
group receiving the program and the counterfactual outcomes
of the same group had it not received the program. Since the
counterfactual outcomes cannot be directly observed, we must
ﬁnd a valid comparison group of nonrecipients whose out-
comes can be considered reasonable proxies for the program
recipients’ outcomes in the absence of the program.
Our dataset includes both households that are Bolsa Famı´lia
recipients and households that are Bolsa Famı´lia nonrecipi-
ents. However, in the context of Bolsa Famı´lia, there are sev-
eral particular challenges in ﬁnding a valid comparison
group of nonrecipients. First, the program was not randomly
assigned. If the program were randomly assigned, then nonre-
cipients would be expected to have very similar pre-program
observable and unobservable characteristics to recipients,
making them a suitable comparison group. As Bolsa Famı´lia
was targeted to poor households, we expect that recipient
households would be diﬀerent from nonrecipient households
even in the absence of the program. If we do not take these
factors into account, we risk attributing all diﬀerences in wo-
men’s average decision-making power between recipients and
nonrecipients to the program, when in fact other factors cor-
related with program receipt (e.g., household wealth) may ex-
plain some of these diﬀerences in decision making. This
concern leads us to use a methodology that accounts for non-
random program assignment.
Second, there is a voluntary component to receiving Bolsa
Famı´lia. Even if observable characteristics are similar across
a group of recipient households and a group of nonrecipient
households, unobservable characteristics that might lead
households to self-select into the eligibility pool and might
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account to avoid selection bias. In the context of Bolsa Famı´-
lia, registration into Cadastro U´nico is voluntary. All Bolsa
Famı´lia recipients must have taken the initiative to register
in the Cadastro to be eligible for program receipt, and there-
fore comparing recipients of the program to nonrecipients
not even registered in the Cadastro might introduce bias. This
concern implies that we should compare recipient households
only to nonrecipient households also registered in Cadastro
U´nico. Our estimates, for this reason, are all ATT impacts con-
ditional on Cadastro registration.
Finally, there could be another level of selection: households
that are registered in Cadastro and deemed eligible for Bolsa
Famı´lia, but that choose not to fulﬁll the conditions, should
in principle also not be receiving Bolsa Famı´lia. However, as
Lindert et al. (2007) emphasize, the primary role of these con-
ditionalities is to promote use of health and education re-
sources. Monitoring of compliance is done largely in the
spirit of assisting beneﬁciaries, not punishing them, and fewer
than 2% were removed for noncompliance. Therefore, this
source of selection bias is of lesser concern.
The key to our evaluation strategy is that the data include a
substantial pool of households that are registered in Cadastro
U´nico but do not receive Bolsa Famı´lia. We take households
receiving Bolsa Famı´lia and therefore registered in Cadastro
as our treatment group, and select a pool of comparable house-
holds not receiving Bolsa Famı´lia but registered in Cadastro as
our comparison group. 14 To address the ﬁrst concern, we de-
scribe in Section 4 how we take into account other observable
diﬀerences between the two groups using propensity score
weighting (beyond which it is reasonable to assume that
remaining correlates of decision making outcomes are uncorre-
lated with treatment status). In the next subsection, we describe
how conditioning on Cadastro registration likely substantially
helps account for selection bias, addressing the second concern.
(d) Construction of treatment and comparison groups
Based on the considerations above, our choice of compari-
son group consists of all households who report being listed
in Cadastro U´nico in either 2005 or 2009, who are “compara-
ble” to Bolsa Famı´lia recipients on several other dimensions,
but who do not receive Bolsa Famı´lia transfers in 2005 or
2009. For our treatment group, we construct two versions.
The ﬁrst (“Treatment Deﬁnition 1”) includes all households
who were listed in Cadastro U´nico in 2005 but did not receive
Bolsa Famı´lia transfers in 2005 (thereby looking very similar to
the comparison households in 2005), yet started receiving Bol-
sa Famı´lia transfers by the 2009 round. This version of the
treatment deﬁnitions allows the cleanest interpretation. How-
ever, the number of households that fall within this ﬁrst deﬁ-
nition of the treatment is relatively small. 15 Therefore, we
construct a second treatment deﬁnition (“Treatment Deﬁni-
tion 2”) that includes all households receiving Bolsa Famı´lia
transfers in 2009, including both those that did not yet receive
Bolsa Famı´lia transfers in 2005 and also those that already re-
ceived Bolsa Famı´lia transfers in 2005. While this deﬁnition in-
volves additional considerations when using propensity score
weighting, it uses all of our available data on Bolsa Famı´lia
recipients, making results more representative of beneﬁciaries
and increasing sample size in estimation. 16 We therefore run
estimates using both treatment deﬁnitions, and compare re-
sults across the two deﬁnitions. We describe analysis of the
comparison group and Treatment Deﬁnition 1 as “Compari-
son 1.” We describe analysis of the comparison group and
Treatment Deﬁnition 2 as “Comparison 2.”Our ﬁnal estimation samples for Comparison 1 and Com-
parison 2 are smaller than the original 2005 sample of
15,426 households for several reasons. First, there is attrition
between the 2005 and 2009 survey rounds, such that the
2009 sample includes only 11,433 households. Second, within
those 11,433 households, only a subsample meets the criteria
to be included in our deﬁnitions of treatment and comparison
groups. Third, there are missing values in our outcomes of
interest that drop the corresponding observations in treatment
and comparison groups from analysis. As shown in Table 1,
Comparison 1 includes 2586 comparison households and
2828 treatment households. Comparison 2 includes the same
2586 comparison households and 5342 treatment households.
We describe below in greater detail how the second and third
factors aﬀect the ﬁnal sample size for estimation, as also illus-
trated in Figure 2.
In constructing our treatment groups, we note that, out of
the 11,433 households re-surveyed in 2009, only 5342 house-
holds report receiving transfers in 2009. Among these, there
are only 2828 households that report receiving transfers in
2009 but not receiving transfers in 2005. These 2828 house-
holds form Treatment Deﬁnition 1. Treatment Deﬁnition 2 in-
cludes all of the 5342 households receiving transfers in 2009.
In constructing the comparison group, we note which non-
recipient households are excluded, in order to capture the
households who are registered in Cadastro U´nico, are “compa-
rable” to Bolsa Famı´lia recipients, but do not receive Bolsa
Famı´lia transfers in 2005 or 2009. Out of the 11,433 house-
holds re-surveyed in 2009, 6091 households report not receiv-
ing Bolsa Famı´lia transfers in 2009. Of these 6091 households,
1512 households report not being listed in the Cadastro U´nico
in 2005 or 2009. Since we condition our impact estimates on
Cadastro registration to help account for selection bias, we ex-
clude these households from our comparison group. There are
also 929 households who report not receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in
2009 but receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in 2005. These households,
who likely graduated from Bolsa Famı´lia due to their income
surpassing the threshold, are also deemed not good compari-
sons and excluded from the comparison group. Finally, there
is a sizeable group of households (1064) who report receiving
beneﬁts from other social programs (e.g., a predecessor smal-
ler-scale cash transfer program called Bolsa Escola, also condi-
tional on children’s school attendance) in 2005. While these
households were not receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in either round,
their receipt of a similar program in 2005 suggests that they
may not be good proxies for the counterfactual situation of re-
cipient households in the complete absence of a program like
Bolsa Famı´lia, and therefore we also exclude them from the
comparison group. Based on these criteria, the ﬁnal number
of households forming the potential comparison group is
2586 households.
Finally, the size of the sample for studying women’s decision
making is limited by omitted observations in the decision mak-
ing variables (Table 2). 17 Based on the above discussion, there
are 5414 total households potentially available for evaluation
in Comparison 1, and 7928 total households potentially avail-
able for evaluation in Comparison 2. There are four main clas-
ses of observations we further omit. First, there are a
substantial number of observations for which the women’s
decision making module was not ﬁlled in (row 2). Second,
there are some households for which the respondent’s person
code was not ﬁlled in, such that we cannot be sure who in
the household answered. Third, the module was sometimes
asked of a male respondent (according to the person code)
rather than a female respondent. Finally, there are some obser-
vations for which the woman who responded to the questions
Table 1. Potential comparisons for impact evaluation
Group Comparison deﬁnitions by number of households
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Treatment 2828 5342
Comparison 2586 2586
Households that did not conform to these comparison deﬁnitions are omitted.
AIBF-1:
15,426 households
Resurveyed in AIBF-2:
11,433 households
After removing 1,152 
households not reporting 
listed in Cadastro Único:
9,921 households
After removing 929 
households that 
graduated from BF 
between surveys:
8,992 households
After removing 1,064 
households receiving 
other social programs in 
AIBF-1:
7,928 Households
Figure 2. Schematic, sample households eligible for inclusion in impact evaluation of Bolsa Famı´lia.
Table 2. Sample size for studying women’s decision making, Bolsa Famı´lia Evaluation Survey 2009 (AIBF-2)
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Households potentially available for evaluation 5414 7928
Module not completed 1935 2790
Missing person code for respondent 53 178
Male respondent 485 678
Female respondent not head or spouse of head 128 177
Total potential sample 2733 4105
492 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwas not the spouse of the head or the household head. As a
result, we have 2733 potential observations for Comparison
1 and 4105 potential observations for Comparison 2.4. EVALUATION STRATEGY
(a) Propensity score weighting
As discussed above, in estimating how Bolsa Famı´lia aﬀected
women’s decision making, we wish to estimate AverageTreatment eﬀects on the Treated (ATT): that is, the impact
that Bolsa Famı´lia had on a range of outcomes for recipients,
using nonrecipients as a proxy for what recipients’ outcomes
would have counterfactually been in the absence of Bolsa
Famı´lia. There are two steps through which we adjust for dif-
ferences in observable and unobservable characteristics be-
tween the Bolsa Famı´lia recipients and nonrecipients that we
compare as the “proxy”: (1) select a comparison group of non-
recipients that, in the ﬁrst place, is likely to be fairly similar to
the treated group of recipients in terms of observable and
unobservable characteristics, and (2) use estimated propensity
Figure 3. Overlap in propensity scores for comparison between Bolsa
Famı´lia recipients and nonrecipients, using Comparison 1.
Figure 4. Overlap in propensity scores for comparison between Bolsa
Famı´lia recipients and nonrecipients, using Comparison 2.
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parison group according to its similarity on observable charac-
teristics to treated observations. Step (1) was described above.
Here, we describe how we undertake Step (2), through a pro-
cess called propensity score weighting.
Propensity score weighting (Hirano et al., 2003) entails esti-
mating and applying weights to statistically balance observa-
ble pre-program characteristics between selected treatment
and comparison groups. We estimate a propensity score for
each household, which indicates the predicted probability that
the household is in the treatment group rather than the com-
parison group, based on a range of observable pre-program
characteristics. We then use the propensity scores p to place
weights on the comparison observations: each treatment
observation receives a weight of one, whereas the comparison
observations receive a weight of p/(1  p). The intuition is as
follows. Comparison households that have observable charac-
teristics indicating that they are very similar to treatment
households are assigned very high weights, whereas compari-
son households with observable characteristics suggesting that
they are relatively more dissimilar to treatment households are
assigned relatively less weight. By placing these weights on
comparison households already selected to be similar to treat-
ment households, we further balance observable characteris-
tics between treatment and comparison households, even if
they were unbalanced before weighting. Hirano et al. (2003)
show that, under a set of reasonable assumptions, applying
these propensity score weights leads to unbiased impact esti-
mates of the ATT. A brief overview of the theoretical basis
for propensity score weighting is presented in Appendix B.
A key advantage of using propensity score weighting is that
it allows us to take into account the sampling weights and
attrition weights that are extremely important in our data.
Incorporating these weights allows us to interpret our esti-
mates of ATT as representative of the treated population,
adjusting for oversampling of certain types of households in
the baseline and selective attrition of certain types of house-
holds in the follow-up. The main disadvantage of using pro-
pensity score weighting as opposed to matching methods is
the higher variance of the estimator (Freedman & Berk,
2008). We also describe our approach to dealing with high var-
iance in Appendix C.
(b) Implementation of propensity score weighting
We estimate the propensity score for a household to be in
each deﬁned treatment group rather than the deﬁned compar-
ison group. When estimating the propensity scores, we aim to
include as covariates all observable characteristics that are
correlated both with the probability of being in the treatment
group and with our outcomes of interest conditional on treat-
ment status. Doing so addresses the bias otherwise associated
with nonrandom selection into the program based on charac-
teristics also correlated with our key outcomes. We start by
selecting a large set of observable pre-program characteristics
that we perceive as having potential to be correlated with both
program receipt and our outcomes of interest conditional on
program receipt status. 18 This set of observables is chosen
keeping in mind the procedure for selection of households into
Bolsa Famı´lia and key characteristics of the household and
municipality that may shape outcomes conditional on receiv-
ing Bolsa Famı´lia: municipality-level characteristics including
demographics that might aﬀect the municipality quota, munic-
ipality-level characteristics that reﬂect initial conditions of
available health and education infrastructure, household-level
characteristics including demographics and poverty indicatorsthat might determine eligibility given the municipality quota,
and household-level characteristics that might reﬂect initial
conditions shaping the impact of receiving Bolsa Famı´lia
transfers. (See Appendix Table 9)
We allow as ﬂexible a relationship as possible in the data be-
tween the probability of treatment and these observable char-
acteristics, rather than imposing a particular functional form.
When estimating the propensity scores, we follow a stepwise
algorithm per Imbens, Newey, and Ridder (2005) that gives
an approximation to nonparametric estimation. This algo-
rithm is brieﬂy summarized in Appendix D.
We compare the distributions of estimated propensity scores
among recipients and nonrecipients (Figures 3 and 4 for Com-
parisons 1 and 2, respectively). If within a comparison deﬁni-
tion, the distributions for the comparison group and treatment
group had not shown substantial overlap, we would be con-
cerned that our deﬁned treatment and comparison groups
were not comparable along observable characteristics. How-
ever, under both deﬁnitions, we ﬁnd very good overlap, sug-
gesting that observables predicting receipt of Bolsa Famı´lia
are distributed very similarly across the two groups and that
weighting observations according to estimated propensity
scores will help correct imbalances between the two groups.
Further, as we show in Appendix Tables 10 and 11, applying
Table 3. Weighted proportion of women who make sole decisions in each sphere, among treatment and comparison groups, Bolsa Famı´lia Evaluation Survey,
2005 (AIBF-1)
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Weighted means Diﬀerence
(Standard error)
Weighted means Diﬀerence
(Standard error)Comparison Treatment Comparison Treatment
Food 0.240 0.227 0.013 0.255 0.244 0.011
Number of obs. 1211 1444 (0.054) 1211 2782 (0.044)
Clothes for self 0.433 0.418 0.016 0.436 0.445 0.009
Number of obs. 1196 1423 (0.055) 1196 2760 (0.045)
Clothes for children 0.363 0.311 0.052 0.352 0.354 0.001
Number of obs. 1073 1332 (0.054) 1073 2608 (0.046)
School attendance 0.214 0.178 0.036 0.238 0.220 0.018
Number of obs. 893 1151 (0.043) 893 2233 (0.046)
Children’s health expenses 0.220 0.174 0.046 0.212 0.211 0.001
Number of obs. 1144 1386 (0.040) 1144 2696 (0.037)
Durable Goods 0.147 0.142 0.005 0.169 0.162 0.007
Number of obs. 1196 1427 (0.033) 1196 2751 (0.034)
Own labor supply 0.432 0.416 0.016 0.432 0.446 0.014
Number of obs. 1199 1425 (0.055) 1199 2752 (0.045)
Contraception 0.275 0.300 0.025 0.274 0.309 0.035
Number of obs. 1140 1388 (0.050) 1140 2684 (0.042)
Source: Bolsa Famı´lia Evaluation Survey, 2005 (AIBF-1).
Table 4. Impact estimates, receipt of transfers from Bolsa Famı´lia on
women’s decision making measures, 2009 survey
Impact on proportion of women
reporting exclusive control
over decisions about ...
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Single diﬀerence Single diﬀerence
Food <0.001 0.008
(0.047) (0.039)
Number of obs. 2444 3671
Clothes for self 0.028 0.039
(0.046) (0.039)
Number of obs. 2428 3644
Clothes for children 0.043 0.031
(0.048) (0.040)
Number of obs. 2038 3644
School attendance 0.070 0.057
(0.045) (0.038)
Number of obs. 1921 3142
Children’s health expenses 0.059 0.074
(0.046) (0.038)*
Number of obs. 2154 3299
Durable Goods 0.075 0.048
(0.042)* (0.032)
Number of obs. 2412 3624
Own labor supply 0.033 0.008
(0.045) (0.038)
Number of obs. 2448 3658
Contraception 0.096 0.093
(0.045)** (0.037)**
Number of obs. 2337 3516
Source: Bolsa Famı´lia Evaluation Surveys, 2005 and 2009 (AIBF-1 and
AIBF-2).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell represents the coeﬃcient
for a separate regression using propensity score weighting (Hirano et al.,
2003).
Outcomes are all measured in the 2009 survey, but variables used in
constructing weights are also from the 2005 survey.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 5. Impact estimates, receipt of transfers from Bolsa Famı´lia on
women’s decision making measures, when spouse was not present for
interview, 2009 survey
Impact on proportion
of women reporting exclusive
control over decisions about ...
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Single diﬀerence Single diﬀerence
Food 0.026 0.047
(0.054) (0.045)
Number of obs. 1610 2446
Clothes for self 0.067 0.064
(0.047) (0.044)
Number of obs. 1596 2427
Clothes for children 0.092 0.059
(0.052)* (0.050)
Number of obs. 1343 2102
School attendance 0.088 0.053
(0.058) (0.048)
Number of obs. 1272 1968
Children’s health expenses 0.073 0.093
(0.057) (0.046)**
Number of obs. 1417 2200
Durable Goods 0.103 0.056
(0.048)** (0.041)
Number of obs. 1574 2400
Own labor supply 0.055 0.009
(0.050) (0.041)
Number of obs. 1601 2423
Contraception 0.111 0.103
(0.056)** (0.047)**
Number of obs. 1538 2423
Source: Bolsa Famı´lia Evaluation Surveys, 2005 and 2009 (AIBF-1 and
AIBF-2).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell represents the coeﬃcient
for a separate regression using propensity score weighting (Hirano et al.,
2003).
Outcomes are all measured in the 2009 survey, but variables used in
constructing weights are also from the 2005 survey.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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indeed balance pre-program characteristics. Before applying
the propensity weights, there are fairly large diﬀerences be-
tween the treatment and comparison groups, some of which
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or below. After
applying the propensity weights, when we compare weighted
means we ﬁnd no average diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁ-
cant any longer, even among those characteristics not actually
included in estimating the respective propensity scores. We
conclude that the propensity scores appear to account for sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between treatment and comparison groups
within both our deﬁnitions.
We further apply the propensity score weights described for
both Comparisons 1 and 2 to each of the decision making vari-
ables and measure the diﬀerence in means between the respec-
tive treatment and comparison groups in the 2005 survey
(Table 3). We ﬁnd no diﬀerences in weighted baseline means
that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level or lower, and the magni-
tudes of all of the diﬀerences are very close to zero. 19 Again,
these baseline outcomes were not actually included in estimat-
ing the respective propensity scores. We therefore conclude
that propensity scores also balance baseline outcomes between
our treatment and comparison groups within both our deﬁni-
tions, giving us conﬁdence to proceed with the propensity
score weighted estimation of impacts on decision making.
(c) Impact estimation
Our analysis focuses on single-diﬀerence impact estimates
using propensity score weighting. Because we have two roundsTable 6. Impact estimates, receipt of transfers from Bolsa Famı´lia on wome
Impact on proportion of women reporting
exclusive control over decisions about . . .
Compariso
Urban Rural
Food 0.049 0.128
(0.056) (0.073)*
Number of obs.
Clothes for self 0.055 0.041
(0.056) (0.074)
Number of obs.
Clothes for children 0.081 0.050
(0.058) (0.080)
Number of obs.
School attendance 0.148 0.147
(0.052)*** (0.082)*
Number of obs.
Children’s health expenses 0.130 0.119
(0.054)** (0.075)
Number of obs.
Durable Goods 0.138 0.086
(0.050)*** (0.071)
Number of obs.
Own labor supply 0.0811 0.093
(0.055) (0.070)
Number of obs.
Contraception 0.164 0.085
(.054)*** (0.067)
Number of obs.
Source: Bolsa Famı´lia Evaluation Surveys, 2005 and 2009 (AIBF-1 and AIBF
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regressi
Outcomes are all measured in the 2009 survey, but variables used in construc
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.of data on our sample households, we could in principle esti-
mate double-diﬀerence impacts. However, there are two rea-
sons to focus on the single-diﬀerence results. First, because
propensity score weighting succeeds in balancing weighted
mean outcomes at baseline between treatment and comparison
groups, estimating double-diﬀerence impacts essentially re-
duces to estimating single-diﬀerence impacts. The main reason
for using double-diﬀerence is to account for any pre-program
and time-invariant diﬀerences between treatment and compar-
ison groups; the pre-program balancing indicates that no sig-
niﬁcant pre-program diﬀerences remain, once our propensity
score weights are used. Second, we have a substantial number
of missing observations for the women’s decision making vari-
ables in the 2005 data. The reasons for these missing observa-
tions in 2005 are similar to the reasons in 2009 (module not
ﬁlled in, respondent was not female, respondent was not the
head or spouse of head), however the missing observations
are in diﬀerent households in 2005 than in 2009. Since any
household observation used in the double-diﬀerence estima-
tion requires nonmissing values for both 2005 and 2009, the
usable sample size for double-diﬀerence estimation is substan-
tially smaller than for single-diﬀerence in 2009. Given that our
sample sizes are already relatively small, and propensity score
weighting is a relatively high-variance estimation method,
small sample sizes further exacerbate the issue of large stan-
dard errors. Since the single-diﬀerence estimator is valid in
our context, we prefer to conduct the analysis on the larger
sample sizes possible with the single-diﬀerence estimator. For
reference, we also show double-diﬀerence estimates of aggre-
gate impacts in Appendix Table 12. Sample sizes are smaller,n’s decision making measures: by urban or rural residence, 2009 survey
n 1 Comparison 2
Diﬀerence Urban Rural Diﬀerence
0.177 0.037 0.055 0.092
(0.091)* (0.048) (0.062) (0.079)
2444 3671
0.096 0.083 0.070 0.157
(0.092) (0.050)* (0.058) (0.076)**
2428 3644
0.131 0.068 0.053 0.121
(0.100) (0.049) (0.067) (0.083)
2038 3142
0.296 0.118 0.097 0.216
(0.098)*** (0.046)*** (0.070) (0.085)**
1921 2944
0.250 0.147 0.085 0.232
(0.092)*** (0.046)*** (0.064) (0.078)***
2154 3299
0.224 0.081 0.027 0.108
(0.087)*** (0.037)** (0.059) (0.071)
2412 3624
0.174 0.063 0.119 0.182
(0.089)* (0.047) (0.058)** (0.074)**
2448 3658
0.249 0.180 0.110 0.290
(0.085)*** (0.043)*** (0.060) (0.074)***
2337 3516
-2).
on using propensity score weighting (Hirano et al., 2003).
ting weights are also from the 2005 survey.
496 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand therefore statistical signiﬁcance is lower, but signs of coef-
ﬁcients are very similar.
5. RESULTS
(a) Basic impact estimates
We begin by presenting ATT impact estimates for the entire
sample at the aggregate level (Table 4). We ﬁnd that, in our
aggregated estimation sample, women’s decision-making
power regarding the use of contraception is signiﬁcantly in-
creased by receiving Bolsa Famı´lia. Both Comparison 1 and
Comparison 2 suggest that Bolsa Famı´lia causes a nearly 10
percentage point increase in women being the sole decision
maker regarding contraception use. We also ﬁnd indications
of weakly signiﬁcant increases in women’s decision-making
power regarding purchase of durable goods and children’s
health expenses. 20
The results on contraception are of particular interest. While
we cannot infer from the survey questions whether being the
decision maker regarding contraception necessarily means
deciding to use contraception (as opposed to deciding not to
use contraception), this result is particularly compelling in
light of concerns that programs providing per-child transfers
may induce increased fertility. Since the conditionalities for
Bolsa Famı´lia include health visits both for children and for
pregnant women, it is possible that the results on contracep-
tion come partly through women having increased exposure
to information on contraception. If women have diﬀerent pref-
erences for contraception than men, and if women are allowed
to control the resources they receive, they may also have more
bargaining power and greater means to purchase their pre-
ferred contraceptive methods due to Bolsa Famı´lia.
We next present ATT impact estimates only for the sample in
which the female respondent’s spousewasnot present during the
interview (Table 5). Notably, we ﬁnd qualitatively very similar
impacts on this sample as on the full sample, butwith even larger
signiﬁcant point estimates, and even lower p-values. 21 In this
sample, the increase inwomen’s decisionmaking regarding con-
traception use is roughly 10–11 percentage points. The increases
in decision-making power regarding purchase of durable goods
and children’s health expenses are signiﬁcant at the 5% level or
better rather than at the 10% level, and an additional coeﬃcient
estimate is signiﬁcant at the 10% level; that is, we ﬁnd an increase
in women’s decision making regarding children’s clothes. The
stronger results are driven by fewer female respondents report-
ing that decisions are made jointly as opposed tomade solely by
herself, when the spouse is not present during the interview. This
ﬁnding could suggest that the same women whose spouses are
more likely to insist on remaining present during the interview
are women whose spouses would likely have a stronger voice
in household decisions, leading the women to be sole decision
makers in fewer areas. Alternatively, it could reﬂect that the
presence of the spouse during the interview leads a woman to
be more reluctant to respond that she solely makes decisions
on speciﬁc issues, even if in fact she does, highlighting the meth-
odological importance of conducting women’s status modules
without the respondent’s spouse present in order to minimize
reporting bias.
(b) Disaggregated results by urban or rural residence
Given that there appear to be strong and signiﬁcant impacts
of Bolsa Famı´lia on women’s decision making at the aggregate
level, it is of interest to look more closely at whether these im-
pacts aﬀect all women similarly or if there are diﬀerential im-pacts by certain characteristics. An advantage of the diverse
setting of Brazil and broad coverage of Bolsa Famı´lia is that
it allows studying heterogeneity of impacts across diﬀerent
contexts. We disaggregate our results by whether the house-
hold resides in an urban or rural area in 2005 at the time of
AIBF-1 (Table 6). While the dataset is primarily urban and
the sample size is therefore small for rural households, there
are meaningful ﬁndings that emerge through this disaggrega-
tion. We ﬁnd that in urban areas, the impacts on contracep-
tion are even larger and more highly signiﬁcant than in our
aggregate estimates, with increases in the range of 16–18%.
Moreover, there are also signiﬁcant increases in many other
areas including children’s school attendance (12–15%), chil-
dren’s health expenses (13–15%), and durable goods (8–
14%). In fact, this disaggregation reveals that all signiﬁcant
positive impacts in our sample are concentrated in urban
areas. Meanwhile in rural areas, we ﬁnd that Bolsa Famı´lia
causes no signiﬁcant increases and possibly even reductions
in women’s decision-making power. Despite sample sizes
being smaller in rural areas than urban areas, the diﬀerences
between estimated impacts are statistically signiﬁcant, indicat-
ing there is a meaningful diﬀerence in how Bolsa Famı´lia af-
fects women’s decision making across urban and rural areas.
This result is consistent with ﬁndings in related work on Bol-
sa Famı´lia’s eﬀects on labor supply. de Brauw, Gilligan, Hodd-
inott, and Roy (2012) show that, while Bolsa Famı´lia causes
positive or insigniﬁcant changes in women’s labor supply in
urban areas, it causes signiﬁcant decreases in women’s labor
supply in rural areas. They posit that one reason for the diﬀer-
ential impacts on labor supply may be diﬀerences in time re-
quired of women to fulﬁll conditionalities between urban
and rural areas, owing to greater remoteness and longer travel
times to clinics, schools, etc., in rural areas. If reduction in wo-
men’s labor supply in rural areas leads to reduction in wo-
men’s income and control of resources, the program may
not improve decision-making power among rural women. This
explanation may also reconcile our ﬁnding of insigniﬁcant or
negative impacts on decision making in rural areas with ﬁnd-
ings of Attanasio and Lechene (2002), Attanasio and Lechene
(2010) and others of small positive impacts in rural Mexico.
Because Progresa and Oportunidades excluded coverage of
the most remote rural areas in Mexico, requiring that there
be a primary school situated within the locality and a health
center within 5 km (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009), the eﬀects of
remoteness may not be as strong in those programs as in Bolsa
Famı´lia where coverage is broader.
The diﬀerences we ﬁnd in Bolsa Famı´lia’s impacts on rural
and urban women’s voices in intrahousehold decision making
are also closely supported by qualitative work on Bolsa Famı´-
lia beneﬁciary women conducted in 2006 (Suarez & Libardoni,
2008). Based on the ten municipalities in which they conduct
ﬁeldwork, Soares and Libardoni report the following (empha-
sis ours): “To the question whether women now had more
inﬂuence and are more respected by the family members after
receiving the beneﬁt, most of the answers point to very signif-
icant changes. In the more rural municipalities, the change is ex-
pressed in terms of the women now being more respected,
because they no longer depend on their husbands or partners
and because they can contribute to the family expenditure. In
these statements, the ability to make a choice is not perceived or
commented. . . . In more urbanized municipalities, such as Sa˜o
Luis, the answers to the same question reveal that through
the Bolsa Famı´lia not only are the women able to contribute
to household expenses but they also appreciate the fact that they
can make choices and can now negotiate with their husbands.”
The qualitative ﬁndings also suggest that, although rural wo-
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fected by the program, Bolsa Famı´lia may still improve their
social status in the household in another dimension: feeling
more respected by other household members.6. CONCLUSION
We begin by noting some caveats. First, we do not know to
what extent these impacts are speciﬁc to CCT program fea-
tures as opposed to any cash transfer program (see discussion
of related issues in Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, and Teixeira,
Soares, Silva, & Hirata, 2011). We do not show, for example,
that giving the transfer to the woman is what actually in-
creases women’s decision-making power. Since theory predicts
that resource control aﬀects bargaining power, it is reasonable
to assume that the preferential transfers to women are what
primarily drive the impacts on women’s decision making.
However, in principle, we cannot be sure that the same im-
pacts on women’s decision making might not be observed if
the transfers were received by men or any other member of
the household (e.g., if increased total household income is in
fact the factor that causes increases in women’s decision-mak-
ing power). Nor do we know if the program conditionalities
aﬀect the impact of transfers on women’s decision making,
as there are no households receiving unconditional transfers
against which to compare. It may be the case that even uncon-
ditional transfers would aﬀect women’s decision-making
power.
Second, our measures of women’s decision-making power
refer to a woman’s subjective assessment of her own deci-
sion-making role in several general spheres of household deci-
sions and are therefore subject to reporting bias. However,
acknowledging that women may self-report responses to these
questions inaccurately, it is notable that there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in these responses between Bolsa Famı´lia recipients
and nonrecipients that can be attributed causally to Bolsa
Famı´lia. Moreover, the distinct spheres addressed by these
measures allow us to estimate impacts on various dimensions
of decision making, across which we would expect to see dif-
ferent impacts based on previous qualitative work.
Third, we have a substantial number of missing values for
women’s decision making variables, which aﬀects our sample
sizes. However, because these missing values are roughly bal-
anced across our treatment and comparison groups, we expect
that they do not bias our results. Moreover, while the missing
values do reduce our sample, the initially large number ofhouseholds in the survey leaves us with still meaningfully large
sample sizes for estimation.
Mindful of these caveats, we interpret our ﬁndings as indic-
ative that Bolsa Famı´lia had meaningful impacts on women’s
control over decision making, but with considerable heteroge-
neity. In our aggregated estimation sample, we ﬁnd that wo-
men’s decision-making power regarding the use of
contraception is signiﬁcantly increased by receiving Bolsa
Famı´lia. While we cannot infer whether being the decision ma-
ker regarding contraception necessarily means deciding to use
contraception (as opposed to deciding not to use contracep-
tion), this result is particularly interesting in light of concerns
that programs providing per-child transfers may induce in-
creased fertility. Disaggregating between urban and rural
areas, we ﬁnd that in urban areas, not only are the impacts
on contraception even larger and more highly signiﬁcant,
but there are also signiﬁcant increases in many other areas
including children’s school attendance, children’s health ex-
penses, and durable goods. In fact, this disaggregation reveals
that all signiﬁcant positive impacts in our sample are concen-
trated in urban areas. Meanwhile in rural areas, we ﬁnd that
Bolsa Famı´lia causes no signiﬁcant increases and possibly even
reductions in women’s decision-making power. While estima-
tion sample size is relatively smaller in rural areas than in ur-
ban areas, the diﬀerences in estimated impacts between urban
and rural areas are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that cash
transfers to women may translate very diﬀerently to women’s
resource control in urban and rural areas. These results are
consistent with ﬁndings in related work on the program’s dif-
ferential impacts on women’s labor supply across urban and
rural areas, as well as with qualitative work on Bolsa Famı´lia.
These results oﬀer a contribution to the literature, providing
direct quantitative evidence of a CCT’s impact on speciﬁc
areas of women’s decision making and in showing heterogene-
ity of these impacts based on household characteristics. More-
over, we ﬁnd that where increases occur, the eﬀects occur both
in spheres related to child-rearing and in spheres related to wo-
men’s own welfare and protection of the household, suggest-
ing that the impacts may be interpreted as greater equity in
the household rather than greater burdening of women with
gender-stereotyped roles as argued by Molyneux (2007). As
such, these results indicate that, particularly in urban areas,
conditional cash transfers distributed to women in the house-
hold may be an eﬀective way to give women more voice in
household decisions.NOTES1. Using only the ﬁrst round of our evaluation data, MDS (2007) also
reported more decision-making power among women in Bolsa Famı´lia
beneﬁciary households than among women in nonbeneﬁciary households.
However, this analysis relied on matching post-program characteristics of
households already receiving Bolsa Famı´lia to characteristics of house-
holds not receiving Bolsa Famı´lia, limiting credibility of the counterfac-
tual.
2. In 2008, a complementary program called Beneﬁcio Variavel Jovem
(BJV) was introduced, which added variable payments and a schooling
conditionality for children aged 16 and 17.
3. For example, in some municipalities, oﬃcials go door-to-door for
registration, while in others, households are asked to register at a central
place such as a school, or to attend a town hall meeting in order to
register.4. We were unable to obtain an algorithm for how the quotas were
calculated from poverty map characteristics, suggesting that the mapping
may have been rough rather than derived through a precise calculation.
Municipality-level quotas have also gradually increased over time, as
program coverage has expanded.
5. The maximum income per capita for receiving beneﬁts has increased
over time from R$100 initially to R$120 in 2006 and more recently R$140.
Households with income per capita levels less than half of the maximum
amount are eligible for higher beneﬁt levels.
6. We were also unable to obtain a precise algorithm for how these
criteria were combined and used to prioritize households, suggesting that
the prioritization may have been through visual scanning rather than
consistent constructions of rankings.
498 WORLD DEVELOPMENT7. See Appendix A for a summary of the model used to estimate attrition
weights.
8. Similar questions are asked in Demographic and Health Surveys to
measure women’s empowerment in countries around the world.
9. Where enumerators interviewed male respondents, these cases were
dropped from our estimation.
10. We were unable to ﬁnd evidence for how joint decisions are
characterized speciﬁcally in the context of Brazil.
11. We also ﬁnd that in cases where women’s spouses were present
during the interview, women are more likely to report that decisions are
made jointly as opposed to made solely by the woman, suggesting that this
response may be more common among women who feel inhibited while
answering the questions.
12. While doing so excludes the small number of observations with
responses corresponding to decisions made by children or others in the
household, including these would obscure the interpretation, as dynamics
between women and their children are potentially very diﬀerent than
dynamics between women and their spouses. As only a small proportion
of responses correspond to children or other people in the household,
there is insuﬃcient sample size to deﬁne a separate variable to investigate
the impact on these dynamics.
13. For female respondents who are not either the head or spouse of
head, it is not possible to determine from the questionnaire whether their
spouses live within the household, and therefore we omit them from
analysis.
14. We note that one may consider an alternative impact evaluation
strategy based on regression-discontinuity design—in particular, within
this group of Cadastro registrants, looking only at nonrecipient house-
holds just above the income threshold and recipient households just below
the income threshold. While this idea is appealing, the oﬃcial Cadastro
data containing income information could only be linked to the survey
data for a very small fraction of the sample households, making it
unusable. Moreover, the survey dataset itself does not contain reliable
income measures.
15. Treatment Deﬁnition 1 draws entirely on the sample described as
Stratum 2 in Section 3.1.
16. Speciﬁcally, because Treatment Deﬁnition 2 includes households that
already received transfers in AIBF-1, when estimating propensity scores
for Treatment Deﬁnition 2, we look for comparison group households
that were similar in AIBF-1 only on dimensions that were unlikely to
change with transfer receipt, including demographic characteristics and
relatively stable measures of wealth (as opposed to expenditures, etc.).17. We ﬁnd that these omitted observations are relatively evenly
distributed across our potential treatment and comparison groups,
suggesting that they should not bias the resulting impact estimates.
18. In the case of Comparison 2, since some in the treatment group are
already receiving Bolsa Famı´lia at baseline, we allow inclusion of only
characteristics that are unlikely to be aﬀected by already receiving
treatment.
19. At ﬁrst glance, this ﬁnding is somewhat surprising for Comparison 2,
as a portion of the treatment group had already begun receiving Bolsa
Famı´lia payments in 2005. However, based on household reports as well as
administrative payment history data, most households that received Bolsa
Famı´lia payments in 2005 had only started receiving them shortly before
2005, and therefore any noninstantaneous impacts may not yet have been
realized.
20. If we adjust for potential covariance among estimates in Table 4, a
test of joint signiﬁcance following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007)
indicates that the z-statistic for Comparison 1 estimates is 1.41 (p-
value = 0.158) and the z-statistic for Comparison 2 is 1.65 (p-
value = 0.099). With this conservative adjustment, results are found to
be insigniﬁcant for Comparison 1, but jointly signiﬁcant at the 10% level
for Comparison 2.
21. If we adjust for potential covariance among estimates in Table 5, a
test of joint signiﬁcance following Kling, et al. (2007) indicates that the z-
statistic for Comparison 1 estimates is 1.85 (p-value = 0.065) and the z-
statistic for Comparison 2 is 1.77 (p-value = 0.076). Thus, even with this
conservative adjustment, results are found jointly to be signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
22. We describe below in Appendix D how, in practice, we estimate
propensity scores.
23. Note that this approach diﬀers from matching methods, in that for
matching, only certain observations out of the eligible comparison group
are used—based on some metric of similarity to treated observations,
depending on the particular method—but that typically each of those
observations is then assigned a weight of 1. In propensity score weighting,
all observations in the comparison group selected by the researcher are
used, but each is assigned a weight based on its propensity score. This
approach is preferable for our context, since incorporating sample weights
and attrition weights is then relatively straightforward.
24. We include these observables as covariates in all of our estimates.
25. We use the list of predictive explanatory variables for any regressions
using covariate matching, when we run robustness checks. Since covariate
matching does not parameterize the relationship between explanatory
variables and treatment status, we do not need to include any second order
terms.
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WEIGHTS
Deﬁning attrition as households that were found in the 2005
survey but not the 2009 survey, we follow the correction pro-
cedure outlined in Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moﬃtt (1998a,
1998b). We ﬁrst estimate a probit model to explain whether or
not a household attrits, conditioning on exogenous character-
istics (table below). From this we can construct weights that
take into account the likelihood that households did, or did
not, attrit we calculate the predicted probability that a house-
hold does not attrit. The weights are the inverse of these pre-
dicted probabilities. Households with low probabilities of
being re-interviewed, but who are traced and re-interviewed,
receive higher weights. We include these attrition weights in
all of the estimates reported in the paper.
We ﬁnd large diﬀerences in attrition rates between regions
and rural–urban location in the sample; attrition was highest
in the Center-West region and the Southeast, and lowest in
the North and Northeast. Smaller households were also more
likely to attrit the sample; attrition rates were quite similar for
other important variables, such as Cadastro registration. Cor-
relates of attrition are shown in Appendix Table 7 below.
500 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAPPENDIX B. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PROPEN-
SITY SCORE WEIGHTING
We present here a brief overview of the theoretical basis for
propensity score weighting, based on Hirano et al. (2003). The
aim of our evaluation is to construct, for a range of outcomes,
an estimate of the average impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on those
that receive it—referred to as the Average impact of the Treat-
ment on the Treated (ATT). The formalization of this concept
is as follows.
Let Y 1t be a household’s outcome in time period t if it is a
recipient of Bolsa Famı´lia, let Y 0t be that household’s outcome
in time period t if it does not receive any program beneﬁts, and
let D be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household re-
ceives program beneﬁts and 0 if not (i.e., an indicator of
“treatment”). The impact of the program is just the change
in the outcome caused by receiving beneﬁts: D ¼ Y 1t  Y 0t .
For each household, either only Y 1t or only Y
0
t is observed in
any period t.
We wish to estimate the diﬀerence between the outcome that
treated households would realize if they receive the program
and the outcome that treated households would realize if they
do not receive the program in period t, given a vector X of ob-
servable characteristics of the households:
ATT ¼ EðDjX ;D ¼ 1Þ ¼ EðY 1t  Y 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ
¼ EðY 1t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ  EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ:Table 7. Correlates of attrition, Bolsa Famı´lia evaluations, AIBF-1 to
AIBF-2
Variable Marginal eﬀect Standard error
Characteristics of head, 2005
Female 0.0041 0.00795
Illiterate 0.03063 0.00939**
Beneﬁciary status, 2005
Not registered in Cad U´nico 0.0375 0.01112**
Registered, not receiving BF 0.0289 0.00925**
Income level, 2005
Per capita consumption 0.00008 0.00001**
Tracing information
Number of tracing items 0.00404 0.00089**
Number of key tracing items 0.00677 0.00454
Selected locations: Lives in:
Maranha˜o 0.4922 0.10698**
Piauı´ 0.08534 0.08522
Ceara´ 0.1413 0.07981*
Rio Grande do Norte 0.27783 0.00419
Paraı´ba 0.0702 0.10011
Alagoas 0.1871 0.10781*
Sergipe 0.2522 0.01026**
Bahia 0.0730 0.06040
Minas Gerais 0.1134 0.04051**
Espı´rito Santo 0.1726 0.12725
Sa˜o Paulo 0.2810 0.08382**
Santa Catarina 0.1929 0.23346
Rio Grande do Sul 0.3270 0.08782**
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.3406 0.09042**
Mato Grosso 0.2605 0.10880**
Goia´s 0.4507 0.06901**
Notes: Included, but not reported, are other locations and interaction
terms of state by located in urban area.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.However, only Y 1t and not Y
0
t is observed for households treated in period
t, that is, those with D = 1. Because EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ is not observed, we
must construct a statistical comparison group for recipients out of our
observations on nonrecipients, that is, households with D = 0. In partic-
ular, we must construct a group of nonrecipients and then adjust it in such
a way that balances any observable characteristics X potentially correlated
both with treatment status and the outcome conditional on treatment sta-
tus.
One way of doing so involves estimating a “propensity
score,” P(X) = Pr(D = 1|X). This propensity score is the pre-
dicted probability that any household is a program recipient
based only on its observable characteristics X. The approach
of propensity weighted regression entails the researcher select-
ing a set of nonrecipients to use as a comparison group, then
using estimated propensity scores for program receipt to more
heavily weight the comparison observations with higher pro-
pensity scores. 22 The validity of this approach rests in part
on two assumptions:
EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ ¼ EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 0Þ; ðA1Þ
and
0 < PðX Þ < 1: ðA2Þ
Expression (A1) assumes “conditional mean independence,”
that is, that conditional on X, nonparticipants have the same
mean outcomes as participants would have if they did not re-
ceive the program. Expression (A2) assumes that, based only
on the set of observables X, all observations in the comparison
group have positive predicted probability of being treated.
We ﬁrst consider the case without sampling or attrition
weights.
Under (A1), (A2), and several other technical assumptions,
Hirano et al. show that we obtain an unbiased estimate of
ATT through a weighted regression framework, if the ratio
of assigned weights is P ðX Þ
1P ðX Þ : 1 for comparison: treatment
observations. 23
Hirano et al. also show that the observables X used to con-
struct the propensity score can be directly included in this
weighted regression to account for additional variation and
thereby improve precision. 24
It is straightforward to extend this methodology to the case
where, as in this evaluation, there are also sampling weights
and attrition weights. These weights can simply be multiplied
to the propensity-score weights to derive an “eﬀective weight”
to be used in the weighted regression.APPENDIX C. ACCOUNTING FOR HIGH VARIANCE
The main drawback to the propensity score weighting meth-
od is that the variance associated with the estimator is high rel-
ative to other estimation strategies (Freedman & Berk, 2008).
As a result, one consideration in using propensity score
weighting is the potential to make statistical Type II er-Table 8. Balancing of weighted proportion of female respondents with
spouse present during AIBF-2 interview
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Proportion with spouse
present
Proportion with spouse
present
Comparison Treatment Comparison Treatment
0.378 0.374 0.398 0.358
Note: Diﬀerences between the comparison group and treatment group
within both Comparison 1 and Comparison 2 are insigniﬁcant at the 10%
level.
THE IMPACT OF BOLSA FAMI´LIA ON WOMEN’S DECISION-MAKING POWER 501rors—that is, to accept the null hypothesis even though it is
not true. In practical terms, Type II errors imply potentially
missing signiﬁcant impacts of Bolsa Famı´lia, leading us to take
two speciﬁc measures to deal with high variance.
First, to the extent possible, we lower the variance of the
propensity score weighting estimator by including the covari-
ates used to estimate the propensity score directly in all our
weighted regressions estimating treatment eﬀects. As men-
tioned above, these variables should no longer aﬀect the point
estimate of the treatment eﬀect after propensity score weight-
ing, but act only to improve its precision.
Second, when we ﬁnd impact estimates that are borderline
signiﬁcant (i.e., statistically signiﬁcant between the 5% and
10% level) even after adding covariates, we attempt to also
estimate them via nearest neighbor matching, also known as
“covariate matching” (Abadie & Imbens, 2006) and conﬁrm
that results are signiﬁcant. Covariate matching compares out-
comes among treated observations with outcomes among se-
lected observations in the comparison group for which a setTable 9. Household- and municipality-level characteristics included as possib
propensity
Variable
Household-level variables
Number of children aged 0–15 at baseline
Household size
Number of rooms in house (truncated at 10)
Number of bedrooms in house
Number of bathrooms in house
Housing quality index, from 0 to 11
Whether household owns its house
Log of per-capita monthly expenditure (food + nonfood)
Whether head is illiterate
Head’s years of education
Head’s sex
Municipality-level variables
Average family size
Child dependency ratio
Incidence of poverty
Incidence of extreme poverty
Percent of population working without card
Percent of population working in agricultural sector
Black population, as percentage of total population
“Pardo” population, as percentage of total population
Indigenous population, as percentage of total population
Percent of households with “adequate housing”
Percent of households with access to piped water
Percent of households with access to solid waste collection
Percent of households with access to general sewage network
Percent of households with access to septic tanks
Percent of households with access to electricity
Households with landline phones (per 1000)
Households with cell phones (per 1000)
Average years of education
School attendance rate: 7–14 y.o.
Illiteracy rate: 7–14 y.o.
Number of public schools per capita
Average number of students per class in elementary school
Number of clinics (“postos medicos”) per thousand inhabitants
Note: Municipality-level variables are drawn from the 2000 national census, I
aAll comparisons include as covariates the interactions of region and rural/ur
b Excluded from consideration.of explanatory variables is closest to the treated observation,
according to a distance measure. The estimated treatment ef-
fect is the average diﬀerence for the outcome between the
treatment and “nearest neighbor” comparison observations.
An advantage to using covariate matching is that it is a lower
variance estimation strategy relative to propensity score
weighting. Covariate matching is also entirely nonparametric
and does not rely on the distributional assumptions that
underlie the probit or logit model used to estimate propensity
scores in propensity score weighting. However, covariate
matching does not allow us to readily take into account sam-
ple weights and attrition weights, such that we would expect
slight diﬀerences between the point estimates of impacts based
on propensity score weighting vs. covariate matching. More-
over, covariate matching is very computationally intensive in
large samples and therefore, for a dataset as large as our Bolsa
Famı´lia study sample, is more suitable to use as a robustness
check for borderline-signiﬁcant results than as our primary
estimation strategy.le covariates for propensity scores and included in ﬁnal speciﬁcations of
scores
Year Covariate included in estimation of propensity
score?
Comparison 1a Comparison 2a
2005 YES YES
2005 YES
2005 YES
2005
2005
2005 YES YES
2005
2005 YES b
2005 YES
2005 YES
2005
2000 YES
2000 YES
2003 YES
2003
2000 YES YES
2000 YES YES
2000
2000 YES
2000
2000
2000 YES YES
2000 YES YES
2000
2000
2003
2000
2000 YES
2000
2000 YES YES
2003
2003 YES YES
2003
2002
BGE survey 2002, and IBGE survey 2003.
ban dummies.
Table 10. Comparison 1—Balancing of pre-program characteristics, unweighted and weighted
Variable Included in estimation
of p-score?
Unweighted
means
Weighted means p-value on diﬀerence in
weighted means
C T C T
Household-level variables
Number of children age 0–15 at baseline YES 1.42 2.10 1.72 1.68 0.71
Household size YES 4.20 4.77 4.03 4.01 0.89
Number of rooms in house 5.18 4.88 5.06 5.07 0.96
Number of bedrooms in house 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.22 0.56
Number of bathrooms in house 0.89 0.77 0.83 0.86 0.54
Housing quality index, from 0 to 11 YES 8.25 7.57 7.59 7.83 0.22
Whether household owns its house 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.63 0.26
Log of per-capita monthly expenditures YES 5.20 4.96 5.01 5.10 0.18
Whether head is illiterate YES 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.99
Head’s years of education 3.49 3.52 3.51 3.57 0.82
Head’s sex 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.79
Municipality-level variables
Average family size YES 3.60 3.69 3.58 3.57 0.80
Child dependency ratio 49.49 52.34 49.87 49.55 0.60
Incidence of poverty 39.29 45.74 43.68 42.98 0.66
Incidence of extreme poverty 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.51
Percent without card YES 39.64 43.54 42.99 43.43 0.78
Percent in agricultural sector YES 23.69 27.63 28.23 28.64 0.80
Percent black 6.51 6.69 7.59 7.15 0.29
Percent “pardo” 46.95 51.94 48.42 46.67 0.40
Percent indigenous 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.26
Percent with “adequate housing” 34.98 28.67 33.41 34.03 0.71
Percent with piped water YES 69.70 64.79 68.09 68.56 0.71
Percent with solid waste collection YES 71.24 64.64 67.17 67.31 0.94
Percent with general sewage network 38.56 30.15 37.43 38.74 0.53
Percent with septic tanks 14.28 14.71 12.79 12.09 0.56
Percent with electricity 91.09 88.57 90.06 91.13 0.16
Landline phones (per 1000) 246.47 220.58 240.90 244.13 0.62
Cell phones (per 1000) YES 146.18 131.30 140.03 143.73 0.52
Average years of education 5.57 5.24 5.15 5.17 0.82
School attendance rate: 7–14 y.o. YES 94.51 93.77 93.40 93.57 0.70
Illiteracy rate: 7–14 y.o. 12.77 15.64 14.22 13.55 0.38
Number of public schools per capita YES 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.94
Number of students per elementary class 28.22 28.00 27.59 27.50 0.68
Clinics (per 1000) 2.04 1.80 1.66 1.63 0.81
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Table 11. Comparison 2—Balancing of pre-program characteristics, unweighted and weighted
Variable Included in estimation
of p-score?
Unweighted means Weighted means p-value on diﬀerence
in weighted meansC T C T
Household-level variables
Number of children age 0–15 at baseline YES 1.42 2.23 2.00 1.87 0.20
Household size 4.20 4.84 4.38 4.22 0.23
Number of rooms in house YES 5.18 4.84 4.86 5.02 0.24
Number of bedrooms in house 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.21
Number of bathrooms in house 0.89 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.28
Housing quality index, from 0 to 11 YES 8.25 7.51 7.44 7.59 0.33
Whether household owns its house 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.57
Log of per-capita monthly expenditures (Excluded) 5.20 4.93 5.04 5.02 0.66
Whether head is illiterate 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.67
Head’s years of education YES 3.49 3.57 3.47 3.58 0.58
Head’s sex 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.63
Municipality-level variables
Average family size 3.60 3.69 3.61 3.60 0.78
Child Dependency Ratio YES 49.49 52.46 50.54 50.45 0.88
Incidence of poverty YES 39.29 45.79 45.63 44.52 0.49
Incidence of extreme poverty 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.81
Percent without card YES 39.64 43.84 45.80 44.75 0.51
Percent in agricultural sector YES 23.69 28.47 32.41 31.50 0.60
Percent black 6.51 6.64 7.08 6.93 0.66
Percent “pardo” YES 46.95 51.53 46.44 46.46 0.99
Percent indigenous 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.50 0.11
Percent with “adequate housing” 34.98 28.53 30.97 32.36 0.41
Percent with piped water YES 69.70 64.45 65.66 66.97 0.38
Percent with solid waste collection YES 71.24 64.15 63.45 64.70 0.52
Percent with general sewage network 38.56 30.62 34.17 36.79 0.17
Percent with septic tanks 14.28 14.02 11.77 11.34 0.72
Percent with electricity 91.09 88.38 87.83 89.87 0.07
Landline phones (per 1000) 246.47 225.19 237.68 241.78 0.44
Cell phones (per 1000) 146.18 135.04 139.46 144.01 0.37
Average years of education 5.57 5.21 4.98 5.06 0.43
School attendance rate: 7–14 y.o. YES 94.51 93.73 93.44 93.65 0.56
Illiteracy rate: 7–14 y.o. 12.77 15.70 14.85 14.21 0.41
Number of public schools per capita YES 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.30
Number of students per elementary class 28.22 27.94 27.07 27.22 0.50
Clinics (per 1000) 2.04 1.76 1.47 1.51 0.61
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PROPENSITY SCORES
Our approach for estimating propensity scores in essence
follows Hirano and Imbens (2001) and Imbens et al. (2005).
We start by estimating a logit model including only region
dummy variables interacted with rural–urban dummies, to en-
sure that we account for broad diﬀerences in market condi-
tions. We weight the regression by sampling weights from
the AIBF-1 data multiplied by attrition weights. Next, we start
to consider the set of N variables at the household and munic-
ipality level as possible covariates for inclusion in the logit
model. We estimate N regressions, each sequentially and sep-
arately including one variable to the basic logit model. We
keep the variable that reduces the log pseudo-likelihood the
most. We then take the remaining list of N  1 variables,
and sequentially add the remaining N  1 variables to the lo-git model, again keeping the one that maximizes the reduction
of the log pseudo-likelihood. We follow this procedure until
the reduction hits a threshold that roughly corresponds to
adding a variable to the logit model that has a t-ratio of 1,
indicating that the remaining variables in the list have little
predictive power. 25
We next take the K covariates that are chosen in the ﬁrst
step, and in the second step we square all of them and interact
them with one another, creating an additional K(K + 1)/2
variables. We then add these second order terms to the model
sequentially until no term exceeds a threshold that loosely
indicates signiﬁcant predictive power (e.g., a t-ratio that corre-
sponds to a p-value of 0.1). We repeat this procedure for each
of the three comparisons, therefore letting the data tell us the
relationship between Bolsa Famı´lia eligibility and potential
explanatory variables.
Table 12. Impact estimates, receipt of transfers from Bolsa Famı´lia on
women’s decision making measures, using double diﬀerence, AIBF-1 and
AIBF-2
Decision making outcome Comparison 1 Comparison 2
Food 0.032 0.046
(0.070) (0.054)
Number of obs. 1558 2161
Clothes for self 0.017 0.046
(0.079) (0.060)
Number of obs. 1531 2129
Clothes for children 0.072 0.014
(0.099) (0.072)
Number of obs. 1376 1940
School attendance 0.161 0.168
(0.066)** (0.062)***
Number of obs. 1095 1562
Medicine for children 0.065 0.077
(0.054) (0.051)
Number of obs. 1431 2012
Durable goods 0.112 0.074
(0.051)** (0.046)
Number of obs. 1527 2115
Own labor supply 0.065 0.074
(0.067) (0.053)
Number of obs. 1528 2117
contraception 0.044 0.063
(0.054) (0.056)
Number of obs. 1418 1985
Source: AIBF-1 and AIBF-2.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell represents the coeﬃcient
for a separate regression using propensity score weighting (Hirano et al.,
2003).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
504 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
